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CRAFTING FEE-SHIFTING POLICY 
Benjamin P. Edwards *  
ABSTRACT 
The controversy over emerging fee-shifting corporate bylaw and charter provisions 
presents multiple policy choices.  Delaware’s decision to ban the provisions offers an 
opportunity for: (i) states to offer a meaningful alternative to Delaware; and (ii) the 
generation of  useful information for evaluating whether particular bylaws or charter 
provisions enhance shareholder wealth.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Scholars often characterize Delaware as having won a competition 
over gathering the most state corporate charters.1  With the victory came 
spoils.  One recent estimate projected that Delaware would collect almost 
a billion dollars in 2018 from corporate charter and other business entity 
fees.2  These revenues provide significant financial support for state 
operations, but they do not establish that Delaware got everything right. 
Observers explain Delaware’s dominance with different theories.  
Some contend that Delaware enjoys a massive network effect and its 
dominance continues simply because there are benefits to joining the 
larger corporate paradigm—even when the law might not be optimal for 
a corporation.3  Others argue that Delaware maintains its dominance 
because it offers access to high-quality Chancery courts, specialized in 
resolving business disputes.4  Many believe that states decide against 
challenging Delaware because Delaware could always simply amend its 
laws to copy any innovation delivered by a successful challenger.5 
Despite its current dominance, Delaware’s place may be more 
 
1 See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 567 (2016) 
(“professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein concluded that Delaware has won the 
competition for LLCs for many of  the same reasons Delaware has won the competition 
for corporate charters, and that most other states seem more interested in retaining local 
LLCs than fighting for LLCs from outside their state”). 
2 See Financial Overview, Delaware, https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2018/ 
documents/operating/financial-overview.pdf  (“DEFAC estimates (after refunds)  for 
these categories are $975.0 million for Fiscal Year 2017 and $992.6 million for Fiscal Year 
2018”). 
3 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of  Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 852 (1995) (“Second, the possibility that network externalities are significant 
in the corporate charter market implies that the products produced in that market may 
be suboptimal. Delaware’s dominance may have resulted in too much uniformity in state 
laws.”). 
4 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2102–03 
(2018) (“Delaware’s competitive strategy is principally judicial, not legislative. . .  
Delaware Chancery Court has struggled to attract cases and, as a result, some believe 
that Delaware’s strategy has begun to unravel”). 
5 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf  Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (“even if  a rival were 
to identify some substantial set of  changes that could significantly benefit both 
shareholders and management, . . . [t]he substantial amount of  time that would be 
required for the challenger to adopt changes and for firms to respond to them would 
provide Delaware with ample opportunity to react.”). 
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precarious than many recognize.6  In particular, Delaware’s vaunted 
judiciary may wield less influence now than in years past because many 
shareholder plaintiffs have begun filing suits outside Delaware for 
strategic reasons.7 Delaware may also be less nimble in its responses to 
rival states for two reasons: (i) significant changes in Delaware law may 
draw federal intervention, limiting Delaware’s ability to swiftly respond;8 
and (ii) powerful interest groups within Delaware, namely Delaware 
lawyers that benefit from corporate litigation, may block changes that 
affect their interests and reduce litigation.9 
Given the strategic terrain, state corporate law may soon diverge 
from Delaware on important issues.  Most notably, Delaware’s 
controversial decision to ban most fee-shifting bylaws and charter 
provisions provides an ideal opening.10  After the Delaware Supreme 
Court approved the use of  a fee-shifting bylaw for a non-stock 
corporation in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund. (ATP), many stock 
 
6 LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2103. 
7 Id. 
8 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600 (2003) (“Federal 
chartering is the most obvious means of  preempting state corporate law.  But even were 
there no prospect of  federal chartering--as is the situation today-- federal authorities 
could still make corporate law, as they indeed do.  In doing so, they deeply affect the 
state-to-state race”). 
9 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 851, 873 (2016) (“The basic problem was that S.B. 75 presented an unprecedented 
conflict between the interests of  the State and those of  Delaware lawyers, the interest 
group that dominates corporate lawmaking in Delaware”); Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, 
Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of  Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999, 1009–10 (1994) (“Delaware 
lawyers, in essence, are the Delaware legislature, at least insofar as corporate law is 
concerned.” “[L]egislators are likely to rely on lawyers to supply sophisticated 
commercial and business legislation.  As a result, virtually all of  Delaware corporate law 
is proposed by the Delaware bar, and the bar’s proposals invariably pass through the 
legislature”). 
10 Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 871 (explaining that the ban “is especially likely to trigger 
a migration away from Delaware because it is one of  those rare corporate law changes 
that directly affects the potential personal liability of  corporate officers and directors”); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private Enforcement?, CLS 
BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/QD6P-N9TX (“[T]he 
permissibility of  automatic fee-shifting is a major difference that will fuel 
interjurisdictional competition because it protects corporate managers and directors 
from potential personal liability”). 
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corporations adopted similar provisions as part of  their corporate bylaws 
or charters.11  Corporations began adopting these provisions as a response 
to increased litigation around mergers and acquisitions transactions.12  
Within about a year and over howls of  protest, the Delaware legislature 
banned most fee-shifting provisions at the prompting of  the Delaware 
state bar.13  Because fee-shifting provisions threatened to reduce corporate 
litigation volume, Delaware’s corporate lawyers had significant, self-
interested reasons to support the ban.14 
Many, possibly pretextual, arguments over fee-shifting provisions 
claimed that the provisions would be good or bad for shareholders.  
Opponents argued that fee-shifting provisions would hurt shareholders 
because management would use them to insulate themselves from 
challenge.  In this entrenchment narrative, unfaithful managers would loot 
corporate assets while secure in the knowledge that few plaintiffs would 
sue.  A fee-shifting provision would chill meritorious litigation because 
few shareholders would voluntarily expose themselves to liability for 
staggering corporate litigation fees.  Presumably, corporations with such 
provisions would be worth less to shareholders because they would have 
less freedom to challenge management and a greater expectation that 
management would steal.  Moreover, rational shareholders holding these 
views would sell on the news that a corporation adopted a fee-shifting 
provision.  Supporters, on the other hand, argued that the provisions 
responded to value-destroying shareholder litigation, benefiting 
shareholders by reducing litigation costs and making more money 
available for investment or dividends.  In theory, rational investors 
concerned about excessive litigation costs would prefer to buy shares in a 
company likely to have lower litigation expenses. 
 These questions need not go unanswered. A state could pass 
legislation designed to attract corporate incorporations and 
simultaneously gather information useful for further amending and 
promoting its corporate law.  Access to favored governance innovations 
may draw public corporations to reincorporate or announce the 
 
11 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (“we hold 
that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and 
enforceable under Delaware law”). 
12 See Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2018) 
(“generated a substantial amount of  controversy, but a number of  corporations 
promptly took advantage of  this newly validated right”). 
13 See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 853–54. 
14 Even transactional lawyers might support a ban because litigation risk often drives the 
decision to invest in expensive transactional processes. 
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enactment of  fee-shifting provisions, opening the door for market 
reactions to provide useful information about the provisions’ impact.  If  
stocks tended to fall on these announcements, a state might conclude that 
the provisions destroyed wealth and harmed shareholders.  This evidence 
would support following Delaware and banning the provisions.  On the 
other hand, if  stocks reliably rise when corporations announce or propose 
these changes, the experiment would indicate that the state’s law generated 
wealth for shareholders.  This result might accelerate any shift in market 
share toward a state endorsing fee-shifting provisions because it would 
make a corporation more valuable. 
 In any event, some corporations chartered outside of  Delaware 
will continue to adopt fee-shifting provisions until judicial decisions or 
legislation invalidate the governance rule.  Indeed, a good number of  
corporations chartered outside of  Delaware have already done so despite 
the uncertainty around whether courts will enforce these provisions.  
Legislation offers a way to thoughtfully shape how these provisions 
emerge instead of  leaving the decision entirely to corporate managers and 
courts. 
Ultimately, state competition on this front seems inevitable simply 
because of  potential revenues available from even small inroads into 
Delaware’s near billion-dollar revenue stream.  Despite past lassitude, 
some states have launched challenges attempting to capture increased 
incorporation market share.15  Notably, Nevada began to compete more 
aggressively in the market for corporate incorporations when it raised it 
taxes on corporate charters in 2003.16  Although Nevada has not yet 
captured sizeable market share, it has had some success in drawing out-
of-state incorporations, ranking a distant second behind Delaware.17 
 
15 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 555 (“the alleged vigorous race among states 
vying for incorporations, we argue, simply does not exist. We present evidence that 
Delaware’s dominant position is far stronger, and thus that the competitive threat that it 
faces is far weaker, than has been previously recognized.”). 
16 See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of  Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 
98 VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized on this opportunity by offering, 
and aggressively marketing, a unique product—a no-liability corporate law—that has 
proven attractive to a subset of  American companies.”). 
17 LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2112 (“Compustat data on 7061 public-company 
incorporations show that, as compared with a hypothetical regulatory scheme that would 
require companies to incorporate in their headquarters states, Delaware gains 3879 
corporations (fifty-five percent of  the 7061).  Only four other states gain at all.  Nevada 
gains 282 corporations (four percent)”). 
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This essay suggests an intermediate path for states overseeing 
emerging fee-shifting provisions.  The public securities markets produce 
valuable information useful for evaluating the significance of  new 
information.  States should move to deliberately harness the market’s 
information-generating power as they revise their corporate laws.  If  well-
executed, the end result would be more efficient corporate law rules and 
greater prosperity. 
This essay proceeds in three short parts.  Part I provides a brief  
discussion of  the nature of  corporate law and its goals.  Part II discusses 
the controversy over fee-shifting provisions as an ideal opportunity for 
thoughtful exploration. Part III discusses mechanisms for legislation to 
harness the market’s information-generating power. 
I. THE GOALS OF CORPORATE LAW 
A robust, long-running debate over corporate law’s purpose 
continues between scholars.18  Although a universally accepted consensus 
will likely never emerge, some common and widely held views about the 
purposes served by corporate law suggest metrics for evaluating and 
considerations for crafting new corporate law.19  This Part briefly reviews 
a few, but not all, common positions. 
A.  Coordinated Activity and Wealth Creation 
Many view corporate law’s chief  and least controversial purpose 
as creating social wealth by facilitating economic investment and 
development. One scholar framed the view as “corporate law should 
 
18 See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145, 1154 (1932) (“My conception of  it is this: That there are three groups of  
people who have an interest in that institution.  One is the group of  fifty-odd thousand 
people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its stockholders.  Another is 
a group of  well toward one hundred thousand people who are putting their labor and 
their lives into the business of  the company.  The third group is of  customers and the 
general public.”); Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment 
Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 435 (2013) (“Beyond positive law and 
theory addressing corporate purpose, the normative debate has gone on for decades and 
shows no signs of  abating”); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate 
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71 (2010) (“Over the 
course of  the past century, the famous debate between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd 
in the Harvard Law Review over the nature and purpose of  the corporation has been 
traced and retraced in a pendulum swing between two fundamental positions.”). 
19 See Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of  Systems Theory for 
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 606 (2018) (“Multiple purposes are the rule, not 
the exception, in systems. Indeed, it is hard to think of  any designed system whose 
designer would not have had more than one goal in mind”). 
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facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence 
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment at 
the lowest cost of  capital, subject to exterior regulations that control 
externalities.”20  Notably, this view does not mean that corporations 
should focus on creating wealth exclusively for shareholders or that the 
wealth generated should be distributed in any particular way.21 
This view remains consistent with the influential team production 
model for corporate law.22  Under this view, corporate directors serve the 
interests of  the corporation, understood as the interests of  the 
corporation’s diverse stakeholders that have made investments of  some 
kind in the corporation, and not purely the interests of  the corporation’s 
shareholders.23  It accepts that although shareholders have special rights 
in some circumstances, corporate law insulates directors from direct 
shareholder control.24 
 
 
20 William W. Bratton, Framing A Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723 (2014). 
21 Id. at 720 (“There is no place for shareholder primacy in a statement of  the corporate 
purpose that aspires to general acceptance.  The shareholder maximization norm follows 
from a particular conception of  the optimal incentive alignment within the firm, a 
conception contestable in theory”). 
22 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of  Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 285 (1999) (“The mediating hierarchy model consequently suggests that 
the public corporation can be viewed most usefully not as a nexus of  implicit and explicit 
contracts, but as a nexus of  firm-specific investments made by many and varied 
individuals who give up control over those resources to a [decision-making] process in 
hopes of  sharing in the benefits that can flow from team production”). 
23 Id. at 288 (“Corporate law does not treat directors as shareholders’ agents but as 
something quite different: independent hierarchs who are charged not with serving 
shareholders’ interests alone, but with serving the interests of  the legal entity known as 
the “corporation.”  The interests of  the corporation, in turn, can be understood as a 
joint welfare function of  all the individuals who make firm-specific investments and 
agree to participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation process within the firm.”). 
24 Id. at 288–89 (“we argue that public corporation law encourages directors to serve the 
joint interests of  all stakeholders who comprise the corporate “team” by generally 
insulating them from the demands of  any single stakeholder group, including the 
shareholders.”  “Shareholders enjoy special legal rights not because they have some 
unique claim on directors, but because they often are in the best position to represent 
the interests of  the coalition that comprises the firm.”). 
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B.  Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Although not universally accepted, the most widely-taught 
corporate law norm and conventional wisdom is that corporate law and 
corporations both serve to maximize shareholder wealth.25  This means 
that a corporation’s board of  directors should generally act in good faith 
to maximize shareholder wealth.26 This view holds that: 
[U]ltimate control over the corporation should rest with 
the shareholder class; the managers of  the corporation 
should be charged with the obligation to manage the 
corporation in the interests of  its shareholders; other 
corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests 
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than 
through participation in corporate governance; 
noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong 
protection from exploitation at the hands of  controlling 
shareholders; and the market value of  the publicly traded 
corporation's shares is the principal measure of  its 
shareholders' interests. 27 
Much of  the shareholder primacy framework draws from an 
agency model of  corporate law.  In this model, the shareholders are the 
principals in the relationship and the corporation’s directors, officers, and 
employees all serve as agents.  A corporation’s stock price provides a 
constant referendum on agent performance.28  Embracing stock price 
 
25 Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of  Shareholder Primacy, Signs of  Its Fall, and the Return of  
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (2013) (“[C]ombined 
enthusiasm for shareholder primacy ideology among academics, hedge funds, policy 
entrepreneurs, executives, and journalists, goes a long way toward explaining how 
shareholder primacy managed so swiftly to mature from provocative academic theory to 
conventional wisdom.”). 
26 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek 
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[C]orporate law requires directors, as 
a matter of  their duty of  loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for 
the stockholders.”). 
27 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of  History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001). 
28 Lynn A. Stout, supra note 25, at 1177 (“[S]hareholder primacy ideology led to a number 
of  individually modest but collectively significant changes in corporate law and practice 
that had the practical effect of  driving directors and executives in public corporations to 
focus on share price as their guiding star.”). 
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reactions as a metric to measure corporate law itself  may link corporate 
law more closely to shareholder wealth maximization. 
Of  course, many states now explicitly authorize directors to 
consider other interests with constituency statutes.  For example, Nevada’s 
statute allows a corporate board to consider a variety of  constituencies, 
including the “interests of  the corporation's employees, suppliers, 
creditors or customers” as well as the community’s interest, the State or 
Nation’s interest, and the short-term or long-term interests of  
shareholders.29 
C.  Private Ordering and Transaction Cost Reduction 
Corporate law also serves to provide default rules and reduce 
transaction costs for persons forming corporate entities.30  In the 
contractarian view, corporate law should provide the sorts of  default rules 
that stakeholders would have arrived at if  they had bargained over how to 
structure the terms of  their relationships.31  Outside of  the default rules, 
contractarians expect managers and shareholders to arrive at deals that 
maximize the value of  corporate entities and tend to defer to the parties’ 
choices.32  Some believe that market pressure will encourage corporations 
to enact governance provisions that maximize firm value.33 
 
29 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138 (West 2017). 
30 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (“Corporate law is seen as a way to provide a standard set of  
instructions for the operation of  such a governance structure. In the corporate charter 
much of  this standard set can be replaced by terms better suited to the perceived needs 
of  the parties involved, if  that is efficient and desired, but the cheaper, “off-the-rack” 
terms set forth in the corporate statute will often serve well enough.”). 
31 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (“The normative thesis of  the book is that corporate law 
should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of  negotiating at 
arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low. The positive thesis is that corporate 
law almost always conforms to this model.”). 
32 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1325, 1328 (2013) (“The contractarian theory brought economics into the analysis of  
corporate governance and corporate law, and in doing so it provided a fresh start based 
on simple assumptions and straightforward economic logic. In the absence of  
transaction costs, economic theory implies that managers will customize the terms of  
their relationship with shareholders to maximize firm value.”). 
33 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of  Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 767 (1995) (“In the contractarian paradigm, firm managers are conceptualized 
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D.  State Revenue 
Corporate law also serves the interests of  the state by providing 
franchise taxes, fees, and increased economic activity.  States may make 
changes to their corporate law or supporting infrastructure with this 
financial objective in mind.34 
Notably, investor interests and the threat of  federal intervention 
theoretically constrain state competition.35  For example, if  a state offered 
one-sided terms favoring corporate managers over investors, corporations 
organized under the law of  that state would, in theory, attract fewer 
investors.   
II. EMERGING FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS 
Delaware’s decision to ban fee-shifting corporate bylaws and 
charter provisions provides a rare opportunity for states to offer an 
attractive alternative to Delaware because Delaware’s legislature stripped 
the freedom to adopt fee-shifting provisions from Delaware corporate 
law.  This part briefly traces that controversy and overviews recent 
research. 
A.  Corporate Litigation Expands Beyond the Realm of  Reason 
For some time, deal litigation has increased, driving significant 
costs for shareholders.36  One relatively recent study found that as of  
2013, “97.5% of  deals over $100 million were challenged through 
litigation, and each transaction triggered an average of  seven separate 
lawsuits.”37  It seems unlikely that corporate malfeasance in merger deals 
 
as selecting a set of  charter terms that capital markets price and that investors, in effect, 
purchase when they purchase a firm’s securities.  Because they have incentives to obtain 
the highest value for their firm’s shares, managers attempt to offer terms that maximize 
share values by minimizing agency costs and signaling to investors valuable information 
about the firm.”). 
34 For example, a state might invest in improved customer service by appropriating 
additional funding for the state agency charged with administering ministerial corporate 
law. 
35 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982) (claiming 
that Delaware “has achieved its prominent position because its permissive corporation 
law maximizes, rather than minimizes, shareholders’ welfare.”). 
36 See Jill E. Fisch et. al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis and A Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 558 (2015) (“[T]he frequency of  
merger litigation has risen sharply over the last several years.”). 
37 Id. at 559 (citing Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013  
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has become so widespread as to justify this volume of  litigation.38 
Much securities and derivative litigation suffers from an agency 
cost problem.  In essence, plaintiffs’ counsel face a continual economic 
incentive to press securities and derivative litigation when litigation 
remains profitable for their firms—even if  overly aggressive private 
enforcement reduces shareholder welfare.39  In many instances, plaintiffs’ 
counsel have received hundreds of  thousands in fees paid by the 
corporation while the shareholder class receives mere additional 
disclosure about the deal.40 
The disclosure-settlement problem may even weaken incentives 
to actually deal with conflicts when putting deals together.  Leading 
academic experts have critiqued the litigation in strong terms: 
At the root of  the crisis in shareholder litigation is the 
absence of  meaningful incentives on either side to protect 
shareholder rights. Plaintiffs' lawyers seeking disclosure 
settlements happily trade litigation rights into which they 
have invested little, if  any, real investigative effort. 
Meanwhile, defense counsel, who also collect fees 
ultimately funded by shareholders, set up the settlements 
that result in the abandonment of  shareholder rights. The 
disclosure settlement dynamic may also lead defense 
counsel to take a more cavalier approach to potentially 
 
1-2 & tbl. A (Moritz Coll. of  Law Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2377001 [http://perma.cc/XP2B-8C8B]). 
38 See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 861 (reviewing evidence “suggesting that the pervasive 
problem in this area is not breaches of  duty by directors and officers but rather strike 
suits filed by the plaintiffs’ bar.”). 
39 See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 319 (2015) 
(“Agency cost problems may also drive over-enforcement of  the securities laws. Over-
enforcement issues arise when the plaintiffs’ counsel would litigate to secure fees and 
payment even though the litigation would not be in the plaintiffs’ long-term interest.”). 
40 Courts now recognize that these disclosure-only settlements provide, at best, dubious 
value to shareholders.  See Matthew D. Cain et. al., The Shifting Tides of  Merger Litigation, 
71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 605 (2018) (“In several decisions, judges openly questioned the 
value of  so-called disclosure-only merger litigation settlements in which the only relief  
provided to the plaintiff  class was additional disclosure by the takeover parties.”). 
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serious conflicts or other complications.41 
Delaware’s Chancery courts now recognize that they have 
struggled to control the litigation, with one leading jurist opining that 
Delaware courts’ history of  approving “disclosure settlements of  
marginal value [to shareholders] and to routinely grant broad releases to 
defendants and six-figure fees to plaintiffs' counsel . . . caused deal 
litigation to explode in the United States beyond the realm of  reason.”42   
Excessive deal litigation also has broader consequences.  The 
excessive securities and derivative litigation has also been linked to 
concerns about the competitiveness of  American capital markets.43  The 
Supreme Court echoed this concern in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. 
Scientific Atlanta when it decided against expanding Rule 10b-5 liability.44  
In essence, firms considering whether to offer their securities to the public 
may shy away from American capital markets if  the litigation environment 
will interfere with their operations and create additional costs. 
Investors have good reasons to be skeptical about securities 
litigation.  For many shareholders, securities litigation may be value 
destroying.45  To attract quality directors, corporations must purchase 
insurance to protect the directors from personal liability—otherwise, few 
directors would be willing to serve.  When shareholder litigation settles, 
the funds for defense costs and plaintiffs’ fees often come from either the 
corporation or the insurance policy.  If  the funds come from the 
corporation, those funds cannot be paid out in dividends or reinvested 
into economic activities.  If  the funds come from insurance policies, 
insurance companies react by charging corporations larger premiums for 
insurance.  In either instance, shareholders make less money. 
 
41 Dan Awrey et. al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative 
to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 (2018). 
42 In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
43 See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 865–66 (reviewing evidence that excessive shareholder 
litigation creates “a substantial drag on the economy as a whole”). 
44 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) (“Overseas firms 
with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business 
here . . . .  This, in turn, may raise the cost of  being a publicly traded company under our 
law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
45 See Edwards, supra note 39, at 317 (“[M]ost compensation paid [in securities litigation] 
is essentially circular and wasteful.”). 
 
2019] CRAFTING FEE-SHIFTING POLICY 945 
 
 
B.  The Delaware Controversy 
Against the backdrop of  expanding shareholder litigation, the 
Delaware Supreme Court decided ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.46  
The case upheld a controversial bylaw provision that allowed ATP Tour 
to shift its litigation costs to the plaintiff  if  the plaintiff  did not succeed 
on substantially all claims pressed in its litigation.47  The decision signaled 
that the Delaware Supreme Court might approve private attempts to alter 
the attorney-fee regime for shareholder derivative litigation. 
Notably, shareholder derivative litigation already has a unique fee 
structure.  In most litigation under the “American Rule,” each party bears 
its own fees and costs regardless of  the outcome.48  This differs from the 
English Rule, where the loser pays the winner’s legal fees. Shareholder 
litigation proceeds a bit differently because the corporation normally pays 
the fees for the successful plaintiff ’s lawyers under the common benefit 
doctrine after a settlement resolving the litigation is approved.49   
This dynamic generates multiple consequences.  Attorneys may 
take cases from shareholders with small individual recoveries if  they will 
be able to receive fees for a benefit, even a benefit of  dubious value, that 
is conferred on all shareholders.  This creates an incentive to represent 
dispersed shareholders and gives shareholders a meaningful way to protect 
their rights.  On the downside, the possibility of  lush attorney fees for 
disclosure-only settlements seemingly motivates litigation profitable to 
the attorney, even if  it is not necessarily in the best interest of  
shareholders. 
Controversy erupted in 2014 as some ordinary Delaware 
corporations quickly began to adopt fee-shifting provisions as a means to 
 
46 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (“[W]e hold 
that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and 
enforceable under Delaware law.”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 558 (“Delaware follows the American Rule, under which parties to litigation 
generally must pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs.”). 
49 See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting 
the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2015) (“In spite of  famously declining to 
follow English doctrine on fee-shifting, American courts did adopt the practice of  
English courts of  equity in ordering the sharing of  fees among all beneficiaries of  a fund 
recovered for the ‘common benefit.” (citation omitted)). 
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deter litigation.50  Plaintiffs’ lawyers lobbied the legislature to ban fee-
shifting provisions, and the legislature delayed action after the business 
community protested.51  
The debate over fee-shifting provisions for intercorporate 
litigation has significant implications for shareholders, corporate 
managers, and attorneys.  On the self-interested front, some attorneys 
may oppose it because it will reduce the profitability and demand for legal 
services.52  Corporate managers and directors may favor it simply because 
it may reduce their exposure to litigation.  These personal stakes may color 
how many evaluate fee-shifting provisions. 
Personal stakes to the side, proponents and opponents framed 
their arguments in terms of  shareholder and public interests.  Opponents 
argued that fee-shifting provisions would unduly insulate management 
and allow them to self-deal and take advantage of  shareholders too afraid 
to litigate for fear of  crushing attorney’s fees.53  They also argued that by 
reducing intra-corporate litigation volume, fee-shifting provisions would 
remove judicial oversight of  corporate law, potentially weakening investor 
confidence over time.54 Supporters countered these arguments by 
pointing out that intra-corporate litigation had over-expanded under the 
current incentive system and, on balance, resulted in more harm than 
 
50 See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 858 (“Anticipating such a result, over fifty Delaware 
corporations adopted fee-shifting bylaws by April 2015.”). 
51 See Lisa A. Rickard, Delaware Flirts With Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL ST. J.,. 
Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-with-  
encouraging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328 (“Loud protests from national, state and 
local business groups, as well as individual companies caused the legislature to rethink 
its approach.”). 
52 Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of  Delaware Corporate Law, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (“the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as 
attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of  
Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”). 
53 See CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 4 
(2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL EXPLANATION],  
http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-
PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf  (finding that faced with 
fee-shifting provisions “few stockholders will rationally be able to accept the risk of  
exposure to millions of  dollars in attorneys’ fees to attempt to rectify a perceived 
corporate wrong, no matter how egregious”). 
54 Id. at 6 (“If  investors were to perceive over time that statutory rights and fiduciary 
obligation had become hollow concepts, investors’ confidence could diminish, and 
capital formation could be adversely affected”). 
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good to shareholders.  Supporters conceded that even if  fee-shifting 
provisions might deter some potentially successful suits, the net result 
would improve shareholder welfare.  On balance, it might be better to 
allow some risk of  bad behavior than to perpetuate a system that 
consumes corporate resources in endless disputes. 
Ultimately, the faction opposing fee-shifting provisions prevailed, 
and the Delaware legislature banned fee-shifting provisions.55  In the 
aftermath, many corporate managers expressed dissatisfaction with the 
legislation and Delaware’s failure to reign in excessive litigation.56   
C.  Oklahoma’s Amendment 
While Delaware debated fee-shifting provisions, Oklahoma 
moved swiftly to change its corporate law to make fee-shifting mandatory 
for all derivative disputes.57  Oklahoma’s statute is notable because it 
changed the law for Oklahoma corporations instead of  simply authorizing 
Oklahoma corporations to adopt fee-shifting provisions if  they deemed 
them appropriate.   
D.  Nevada’s Opportunity 
Although Oklahoma already explicitly embraced fee-shifting, 
other states now face a choice between three options: (i) some form of  
legislative adoption and authorization; (ii) inaction pushing the issue onto 
courts; or (iii) following Delaware and banning these provisions.  
 
55 See generally 2015 Delaware S.B. 75. 
56 Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Haven, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 2, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-and-other-companies-sour-on-  
delaware-as-corporate-haven-1438569507 (“Executives of  Dole, DuPont Co., 
Ancestry.com Inc. and other Delaware companies have publicly and privately appealed 
to state officials to find ways to curb lawsuits.”).  Notably, the legislation banning fee-
shifting provisions also authorized corporations to make Delaware the exclusive forum 
for resolving any internal corporate claims.  From an interest-group analysis perspective, 
this might be viewed as an effort to secure additional fees for Delaware lawyers.  See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West) (“The certificate of  incorporation or the bylaws may 
require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively 
in any or all of  the courts in this State”). 
57 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1126 (West) (“In any derivative action instituted by a 
shareholder of  a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon 
final judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party 
or parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as 
a result of  such action”). 
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Nevada may be well situated to continue differentiating itself  
from Delaware in the market for corporate incorporations.58  Nevada now 
ranks a distant second behind Delaware in attracting public company 
corporate charters.59  Nevada’s success may be attributed to changes in its 
corporate law designed to reduce managerial liability.60  Firms concerned 
about the high governance costs associated with derivative litigation might 
prefer to reincorporate into Nevada to take shelter under Nevada’s 
protections.  Moreover, Nevada has attracted attention as a jurisdiction 
that might compete with Delaware.61 
Nevada has steadily embraced a strategy to “differentiate itself  
from Delaware by providing its corporations with minimal liability 
exposure.”62  Nevada’s distinct approach has even been marketed by its 
Secretary of  State.63  Thus far, the effort has had some success at attracting 
corporate charters.  Some firms openly declare that they selected Nevada 
law because of  the liability environment.  For example, one firm released 
a proxy statement advocating for a change to Nevada because 
“reincorporation in Nevada may help us attract and retain qualified 
management by reducing the risk of  lawsuits being filed against the 
Company and its directors.”64   
Current research about the impact of  Nevada law on shareholder 
 
58 See LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2126 (“At present, Nevada, Maryland, Oklahoma, 
Connecticut, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming are either actively competing 
or preparing to do so.”). 
59 Id. at 2112. 
60 Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of  Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 
VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized on this opportunity by offering, 
and aggressively marketing, a unique product--a no-liability corporate law--that has 
proven attractive to a subset of  American companies.”). 
61 See generally Kevin LaCroix, Should Nevada Be the New Preferred Forum? (That’s Right, 
Nevada.), THE D&O DIARY, Aug. 12, 2015, https://www.dandodiary.com/2015/08/ 
articles/corporate-governance/should-nevada-be-the-new-preferred-forum-thats-right-
nevada/. 
62 Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 131, 168–69 (2018). 
63 Id. (“Nevada has been marketing its services by highlighting the greater protections 
afforded to managers, directors and officers under Nevada law.”). 
64 Cleantech Solutions International, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of  
the Securities Exchange Act of  1934, May 22, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/819926/000121390012002971/def14a0512_cleantech.htm. 
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value paints an inconclusive picture.65  Many of  Nevada’s public 
companies trade only over-the-counter (OTC), making it difficult to 
acquire clear stock price information.66  Adding to the difficulty, 
reincorporation from Delaware to Nevada occurs infrequently.  One 
reincorporation event study examining a single firm did not find any 
significant evidence that shareholders cared one way or another about a 
decision to reincorporate to Nevada.67   
Although not definitive, some evidence tends to show that 
Nevada’s approach might be right for some firms.  One recent study, 
forthcoming in the Journal of  Law & Economics, found no evidence that 
Nevada’s corporate law harms shareholders.68  Rather, it found that 
evidence suggested “that Nevada’s pro-managerial system is conducive to 
the value of  the firms that choose to incorporate in Nevada.”69  The 
evidence supports the view that “strong shareholder monitoring and 
stringent fiduciary norms are not necessarily conducive to shareholder 
welfare.”70 
III. PROVISIONAL GOVERNANCE PACKAGES  
A provisional, limited approach may help states decide how to 
proceed.  Importantly, shifting stock market prices for public companies 
provide information.71  Reasonably efficient securities markets swiftly 
 
65 See Barzuza, supra note 62, at 173 (“Despite what one might expect given Nevada firms’ 
high ratios of  reporting irregularities, our study did not find conclusive evidence that 
firms in Nevada were traded in a lower value relative to firms in other states”). 
66 Id. at 174 (“Nevada firms come disproportionally from OTC, which provides only thin 
trading data”). 
67 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2012) (“We could not reject the null hypothesis that 
shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate, as there is no evidence 
of  statistically significant negative or positive abnormal returns generated by the 
announcement of  the firm’s decision to reincorporate under Nevada law.”). 
68 Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value?  Evidence from Nevada, 62 
J. OF L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of  Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of  
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1543 (2007) (“stock prices 
have become more informative[,] . . . .individual stock price movements . . . became 
increasingly decoupled from overall market movements, meaning that firm-specific 
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react to new public information and impound that information into a 
stock’s price.  If  shareholders, on balance, believe that a change will harm 
the corporation in the long run, many may opt to sell their shares, driving 
the price down.  In contrast, news reflecting a higher probability of  a more 
prosperous future causes prices to increase as more investors purchase the 
stock. 
Although imperfect markets do not provide perfect predictions, 
event studies focused on market reactions can provide useful information 
about how investors view particular changes.72  This part sketches a rough 
outline for how a state legislature might deliberately craft its corporate law 
to facilitate using event studies to evaluate market reactions to new laws. 
A.  Clearing Away Confounding Factors 
Event studies often suffer from imprecision when confounding 
factors make it difficult to assess an event or statement’s impact.73  This 
often happens when a company releases more than one piece of  
information at a time.  An event study may be able to see the market 
reacting to new information in the aggregate, not whether a particular 
piece of  information drove the change.74  Consider a stock price reacting 
in the wake of  a corporation announcing two facts at the same time: (i) 
corporate earnings significantly exceeded analyst expectations for the 
quarter; and (ii) a promising and previously-hyped research initiative had 
failed.  If  the stock moves upward after the corporation makes both 
announcements, disentangling the impact each statement had on the stock 
 
factors became increasingly influential.  This greater firm-specific return variation is best 
explained, in the United States, in terms of  increasingly informative stock prices.”). 
72 For a description of  an event study, see Jill E. Fisch et. al., The Logic and Limits of  Event 
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 570 (2018) (“In its simplest form, 
an event study compares a stock’s return on a day when news of  interest hits the market 
to the range of  returns typically observed for that stock, taking account of  what would 
have been expected given general changes in the overall market on that day.”). 
73 Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, Confounding 
Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 583, 605 (2015) (“Causes of  price impacts unrelated 
to the event under study are ‘“confounding effects.’”  “Sometimes confounding effects 
are apparent, such as when, in an event study of  dividend omissions, a firm 
simultaneously announces bad earnings, which makes it more difficult to determine how 
much of  the observed price impact resulted from the dividend omission and how much 
from the negative earnings announcement”) (citation omitted). 
74 See Fisch, et al., supra note 72, at 614 (“When multiple sources of  news are released at 
exactly the same time, however, no event study can by itself  separate out the effects of  
the different news. The event study can only tell us whether the net effect of  all the news 
was associated with an unusually large price drop or rise.”). 
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price may be impossible. 
Carefully structured corporate enabling statutes may be able to 
clear away some confounding factors.  States could reduce confounding 
factors by requiring corporations enacting new governance provisions to 
announce these changes individually instead of  lumping them together 
with other pieces of  news that might also impact the corporation’s stock 
price.75  Although efficient markets quickly incorporate new information, 
the effect is not instantaneous.  To create a buffer around the release, a 
state might require announcements to occur midweek, during trading 
hours, and when no information had been announced for two days before.  
A well-crafted enabling statute might also require that the corporation 
certify it has no intention of  making additional announcements that 
week.76   
This type of  announcement protocol would facilitate efforts to 
evaluate governance announcements.  Although it might be difficult to 
definitively assess how the market reacts after a single firm announces a 
change through this type of  procedure, multi-firm event studies allow 
researchers to speak with much greater confidence about a governance 
rule’s impact.77  As more firms announce through this type of  process, 
observers gain an incrementally stronger sense about a provision’s impact. 
B.  Testing Consistent Packages 
Effective evaluation of  any provisional rule may require trimming 
away some of  the traditional freedom offered by corporate law.  In most 
instances, corporate law serves to enable, allowing lawyers to decide how 
to draft particular provisions or whether to copy language used elsewhere.  
This may result in corporations using different words to accomplish 
roughly the same results.  In some instances, the different wording may 
matter because a reviewing court may see distinctions between differently 
worded provisions. 
 
75 Because of  mandatory disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, this might 
require special board meetings where the issue could be resolved alone. 
76 Of  course, events might require some corporate announcement during that week and 
a state could not prohibit a public company from complying with federal law. 
77 Brav & Heaton, supra note 73, at 586 (“[A]lmost all academic research event studies 
are multi-firm event studies (MFESs) that examine large samples of  securities from 
multiple firms.”) (citation omitted). 
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Significant drafting freedom may also introduce additional 
confounding factors into any attempt to evaluate the impact of  
controversial corporate provisions.  Markets may react differently to 
differently drafted provisions out of  a belief  that courts would interpret 
them differently or that the provisions might impose different obligations. 
Conditioning access to provisional governance rules on the 
adoption of  a uniform package of  terms would reduce many of  these 
concerns.78  As others have noted, legislatures might also allow firms to 
simply opt-in to particular types of  provisions instead of  enabling them 
to craft their own.79  Enabling packages of  legislatively-crafted terms 
would reduce uncertainty and allow the legislature greater freedom in 
experimenting. 
C.  Sunset Provisions  
Legislative bodies do not always function smoothly.  There is 
always the risk that experimental provisions might remain law 
indefinitely—even if  they produce pernicious effects.  Future legislatures 
might have entirely different agendas to pursue and little interest in 
reviewing the outcome of  an experiment.   
Sunset provisions may serve to mitigate some of  these risks.80  
The provisions specify that a particular law will go out of  effect in the 
future unless the legislature affirmatively renews it.81  With a sunset 
provision in place, a future legislature would have to decide that the 
experiment had been a success and opt to authorize the provisions on a 
permanent basis. 
Of  course, including sunset provisions may increase risks for 
corporate entities.  A corporation may hesitate to incur the cost and 
 
78 Cf. Barzuza, supra note 62, at 179 (“findings also lend support to a novel policy 
approach: creating a menu of  minimal governance packages for firms to choose from. 
For example, if  a firm chooses to incorporate in Nevada it should also have to adopt 
both proxy access and majority voting to ensure board accountability.  So, a Nevada 
package will include a proxy access and a majority voting term.”). 
79 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of  Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 840–41 (1995) (“This suggestion is not as radical or difficult to apply as it may 
appear.  State legislatures would enact the menus just as they now enact default rules. 
They would be written to attract groups of  firms with identifiable contractual needs, just 
as default rules are to be designed for the majority of  firms”). 
80 See SUNSET LAW, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A statute under which a 
governmental agency or program automatically terminates at the end of  a fixed period 
unless it is formally renewed”). 
81 Id. 
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expense associated with reincorporation or adoption if  the benefits would 
be available only fleetingly. 
A decade might provide a reasonable amount of  time to test a 
new corporate law package.  The enabling legislation must allow enough 
time for the governance package to be thoroughly vetted.  It would allow 
corporations to opt in to the experimental corporate package over time 
and time for the markets to learn how to evaluate these provisions.  Much 
of  that learning might only occur after slow-moving courts interpret the 
new provisions. 
Importantly, sunset provisions only provide for an automatic end 
at a specific point in the future.  They do not require a legislature to 
continue an experiment past the point where results become obvious.  If  
a governance package proves to be value-destroying or otherwise unwise, 
the legislature could simply rescind its authorization for the package. 
D.  Funding Review 
Corporate law also provides an ideal landscape for this sort of  
provisional authorization because corporate fees may be used to pay the 
costs associated with the process.  In creating a provisional governance 
package, a state legislature might simply condition corporate adoption of  
particular provisions on the payment of  specific, additional fees.  These 
fees could be used for general state revenues, education, or for funding 
studies to review the impact of  new governance provisions.   
The market might react positively to experimental packages tied 
to funding provisions.  These provisions would signal state commitment 
to optimizing corporate law and the development of  useful information.  
They would also mitigate the fear that fee-shifting or other provisions 
might be enacted by a state eager to race to the bottom to maximize its 
own revenue. 
In any event, modest additional fees would not be a sticking point 
for corporate actors.  Corporations concerned about high governance 
costs would likely gladly pay an additional annual fee to participate.  In 
many instances, a general counsel would enthusiastically recommend that 
a corporation pay an extra $10,000 a year if  it reduced the risk of  paying 
millions in defense costs to defend against derivative litigation. 
E.  Considerations for Framing A Fee-Shifting Package 
Fee-shifting provisions provide a novel opportunity for some 
provisional authorization.  Despite Delaware’s ban, fee-shifting provisions 
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also provide a reasonable response to excessive litigation.  The provisions 
have a long history of  use in the bond market which provides an 
analogous situation for two reasons: “(1) that both are investors to a 
corporation and (2) that dispersed ownership often leads to similar 
collective action problems.”82   
Not all fee-shifting provisions are alike. For example, the federal 
Trust Indenture Act explicitly authorizes fee-shifting at the discretion of  
the court.83  In explaining the basis for authorizing fee-shifting, then SEC 
Commissioner, William O. Douglas, stated that the provision served “so 
as not to make too profitable just plain, ordinary strike suits, where suits 
are brought by irresponsible people merely in order to get a little money 
[through early settlement] from the trustees.”84  Other contracts impose 
different terms.  For example, the American Bar Association’s Model 
Stock Purchase Agreement makes fee shifting mandatory and symmetric: 
10.12. ATTORNEYS’ FEES[.] In the event any 
Proceeding is brought in respect of  this Agreement or any 
of  the documents referred to in this Agreement, the 
prevailing party will be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in such 
Proceeding, in addition to any relief  to which such party 
may be entitled. 85 
The symmetrical approach embraced by the ABA’s Model Stock 
Purchase Agreement differs from the approach initially pursued by 
Delaware corporations.86  For example, Echo Therapeutics adopted a 
broad fee-shifting bylaw that would push costs and fees onto plaintiffs 
whenever they achieved only a partial victory:87 
 
82 Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59, 98 (2018). 
83 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ooo(e) (West). 
84 Regulation of  Sale of  Securities: Hearing on S. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & 
Exch. of  the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 75th Cong. 69 (1937) (statement of  
William O. Douglas, Comm’r, Securities & Exchange Commission). 
85 Model Stock Purchase Agreement, § 12.15 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010). 
86 See Choi, supra note 82, at 97-98 (“Under the ATP Tour bylaws, by contrast, when the 
plaintiff  ‘does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in 
substance and amount, the full remedy sought, the plaintiff  will still have to reimburse 
the defendant’s litigation expenses.”) (citation omitted). 
87 Id. at 71 (explaining that with the Echo Therapeutics bylaw, “fee-shifting applies in 
only one direction, from the defendant to the plaintiff, and even when the plaintiff  
achieves a partial victory.  The provision shifts the defendant’s litigation expenses to the 
plaintiff  when the plaintiff  ‘does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially 
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5.13. Litigation Costs. To the fullest extent permitted by 
law, in the event that (i) any current or prior stockholder 
or anyone on their behalf  (“Claiming Party”) initiates or 
asserts any claim or counterclaim (“Claim”) or joins, 
offers substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial 
interest in any Claim against the Corporation and/or any 
Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, and (ii) the 
Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial 
assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the 
Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not 
obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially 
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, 
then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and 
severally to reimburse the Corporation and any such 
Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, the greatest 
amount permitted by law of  all fees, costs and expenses 
of  every kind and description (including but not limited 
to, all reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation 
expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties 
may incur in connection with such Claim.88 
This type of  broad bylaw drew substantial criticism as potentially 
overreaching because it seemingly covers both derivative and direct 
litigation.  Derivative claims are claims that return money to the 
corporation—with the fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys determined by the 
court.89  In contrast, direct claims return funds directly to shareholders 
and a plaintiff  attorney’s recovery will ordinarily be governed by 
contract.90  Before Delaware banned fee-shifting provisions, one 
Chancery Court jurist hinted that he would likely rule that these bylaw 
 
achieves . . . the full remedy sought.”). 
88 Echo Therapeutics, Inc., Amended and Restated By-Laws of  Echo Therapeutics, Inc. 
9 (July 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1031927/0001415889140 
02261/ex3-2.htm. 
89 See Choi, supra note 82, at 71 (“In a derivative lawsuit, if  there is any monetary recovery, 
the recovery will go to the corporation (and not to the plaintiff-shareholders); perhaps 
more importantly, the amount of  expenses that the plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover will 
be determined by the court”). 
90 Id. 
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provisions could not reach direct claims.91 
Putting precise linguistic framing to the side, legislatively 
authorizing a form of  symmetrical fee-shifting for intracorporate 
litigation would likely provide significant benefits.  Fee-shifting provisions 
would force plaintiffs’ attorneys to consider the costs as well as their 
potential gains, driving them toward more judicious decisions about when 
to sue.92  In the aggregate, this type of  provision might reduce governance 
costs for corporations with these bylaws.   
Legislative authorization for fee-shifting allows the legislature to 
control the scope and severity of  these provisions.  A state with a well-
functioning business court might opt to make fee-shifting discretionary at 
the option of  the trial court.  A state concerned about maximizing 
deterrence and minimizing governance costs might opt to make fee-
shifting mandatory. 
F.  Inaction as a Policy Alternative 
Importantly, legislative inaction does mean that corporations 
chartered in states other than Delaware will not successfully enact fee-
shifting bylaws and charter provisions anyway.  Consider Nevada for an 
example.  There are now at least seven different Nevada-registered public 
corporations with fee-shifting provisions.93   
Substantial uncertainty remains about these provisions.  For 
example, although these provisions have not yet been evaluated by 
Nevada courts, a Nevada court might follow ATP Tour’s reasoning and 
uphold the provisions.  This result would likely attract substantial publicity 
and lead other corporations to adopt similar provisions.  As adoption 
expands, the opportunity to structure how corporations enact these 
provisions to foster better observations might pass.  It might also become 
 
91 See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 8885-VCL, at 50 
(May 20, 2015), https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=223710 (“A 
Rule 10b-5 claim under the federal securities laws is a personal claim akin to a tort claim 
for fraud. The right to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim is not a property right associated with 
shares, nor can it be invoked by those who simply hold shares of  stock.”). 
92 See Choi, supra note 82, at 111 (“Th[is] Article has argued that a more even-handed, 
symmetric fee-shifting provision can lead to better screening of  meritorious lawsuits 
from frivolous ones . . . .”). 
93 See, e.g., 10-K | EX-3.2, Lone Star Gold, Inc., CIK 0001464865, 000-54509, May 25, 
2018, 5 page(s), Art. X (“In the event that any shareholder initiates or asserts a claim 
against the Corporation . . . and the shareholder does not obtain . . . the full remedy 
sought, then such shareholder shall be obligated . . . to reimburse the Corporation . . . 
for all fees, costs and expenses of  every kind and description . . . .”). 
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increasingly difficult to enact limitations on fee-shifting provisions as 
more firms adopt the provisions and devote resources to defending the 
provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
States now face a range of  choices between following Delaware 
and banning fee-shifting provisions, adopting an intermediate approach 
to cautiously test the provisions as outlined in this essay, and doing 
nothing.  This essay makes the case for the intermediate approach and 
recognizes that fee-shifting provides an opportunity for thoughtful 
competition with Delaware. 
Explicit legislative involvement offers real benefits.  For corporate 
actors, legislative authorization would substantially reduce uncertainty 
about whether fee-shifting provisions would be enforceable. Diminished 
uncertainty would also make the provisions more effective at deterring 
strike suits and other extraordinarily low-probability litigation.  For 
shareholder advocates concerned about preserving shareholder rights, 
legislative authorization provides a way to moderate the provisions 
enacted.   
Importantly, the market-harnessing suggestions outlined here 
provide a framework for assessing fee-shifting’s impact in the future. 
These provisions will remain controversial.  A process that generates 
evidence showing that the provisions harm shareholders will likely check 
their expansion.  On the other hand, if  the provisions reduce governance 
costs without any significant ill effects, they will provide a valuable 
mechanism for checking excessive litigation.   
